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1. Introduction 
It is often said that autonomous robots should be trustworthy or dependable, meaning by this 
safe, secure, reliable, etc This terms are too general to be useful, so we prefer to limit the 
scope of this chapter to two of their inter-related components - safety and security. They 
must be built into a system from the start; it is difficult, if not impossible, to add them in an 
adequate and cost-effective manner later on.  
We view autonomous robots as situated, real-time embedded systems endowed with 
enough intelligence to adapt to changing environment and learn from their experience. They 
may operate unattended and through an unsafe operation may cause significant human, 
economic or mission losses. The focus of this chapter is on safety and security of robot 
control software. This software allows unprecedented complexity of robotic systems, which 
goes beyond the ability of current engineering techniques for assuring acceptable risk.  
Most of the publications on safety has a form of recommendations on providing safe 
environment for robot operators, like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
regulations or the more recent  NASA recommendations for space robots. This approach is 
effective when accidents are primarily caused by hardware components failures.  
As software becomes more and more important in robot control, we have to consider ways 
to prevent accidents caused by software.  
Robot control software consists of many interacting components. Accidents arise in the 
interactions among the components rather than the failure of individual components.  
The need for safety is obvious, but how to ensure it is less obvious. Autonomous robots may 
operate unattended and through an unsafe operation may cause significant human, 
economic, or mission losses. Similar problems were encountered early on in manufacturing 
automation; but autonomous mobile robots may change their behaviour and operate in 
much less controlled environments.  
We will review at first the principal concepts of system safety like risk and hazard and some  
traditional approaches to dealing with them. We consider security as a subset of safety and 
we will present our point of view on this issue. 
The present trend to make the robots more autonomous requires new approaches to deal 
with much more complex problems of their safety. After review of several robot control 
architectures from the viewpoint of their  safety we present an approach based on systems 
theory. While the theory was developed long time ago it turns out very useful to ensure 
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safety of complex software systems. We apply it in so called intention specification, which 
allows a designer to explain why a specific decision was made and to introduce safety 
constraints. 
2. Principal concepts of system safety 
Safety refers to the ability of a system to operate without causing an accident or an 
unacceptable loss (Leveson 1995). An accident is an undesired and unplanned (not 
necessarily unexpected) event that results in (at least) a specified level of  loss. To prevent 
accidents, something must be known about their precursors, and these precursors must be 
under control of the system designer. To satisfy these requirements, system safety uses the 
concept of a hazard. There are many definitions of hazards. We will define a hazard as a 
state or set of conditions of a system that, together with other conditions in the environment 
of the system may lead to an accident (or loss). We define therefore a hazard with respect to 
the environment of the robot. 
In case of physical systems, existence of a hazard depends on how the boundaries of the 
system have been drawn – they must include the object that is damaged plus all the 
conditions necessary for the loss. 
This does not apply to software, since it is not a physical object, only an abstraction. Thus 
software by itself is not safe or unsafe, although it could theoretically become unsafe when 
executed on a computer. Thus we can talk only about the safety of software and its hazards 
in the context of a particular system design within which it is being used. Otherwise, the 
hazards associated with software do not exist. Due to this, the system safety engineers 
prefer to use the term software system safety instead of software safety. 
A hazard has two important characteristics: severity and likelihood of occurrence. Hazard 
severity is defined as the worst possible accident that could result from the hazard given the 
environment in its most unfavourable state. 
The hazard likelihood of occurrence can be specified either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Unfortunately, when the system is being designed and hazards are being analysed and 
ranked as to which should be eliminated first, the information needed to evaluate the 
likelihood accurately is almost never available. It means, the best what can be done is to 
evaluate the likelihood  qualitatively. 
The combination of severity and likelihood of occurrence is often called the hazard level. 
Hazard level, along with two other factors related hazards, are used in the definition of risk. 
Risk is the hazard level combined with (1) the likelihood of the hazard leading to an 
accident and (2) hazard exposure or duration. Duration is a component of a risk, since the 
longer the hazardous state exists, the greatest the chance is that the other prerequisite 
conditions will occur.  
The relationship between hardware and software hazards is shown on Fig.1, where: 
Design dysfunction means any hazard inadvertently built-into the system design due to 
design and integration, e.g.: design error, design interface error/oversight, design 
integration error/oversight, tool errors; 
Code error is any hazard inadvertently built-into the system design due to a coding error, 
e.g.: wrong sign (+/-), endless loop, language error; 
Hardware induced software error - any hazard resulting from hardware failure causing 
safety critical software error, e.g. memory error, memory jump, bit error, change of value of 
a critical variable. 
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Risk = ?
Risk = Probability x Severity
The 3 ways SW can cause 
safety related hazards.
P = 1.0 x e-T P = 1 or 0 P = 1 or 0
Hardware
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Immature SW ?  
Fig. 1. Generic software hazard model 
As an example of  risk evaluation let’s take the case when a computer controls movements 
of a robot. 
The risk is then a function of the  
- probability that the computer causes a spurious or unexpected robot movement, 
- probability that a human is in the field of movements, 
- probability that the human has no time to move or will fail to diagnose the robot failure, 
- severity of worst-case consequences. 
If the computer executes a robot control software monitoring the state of the system and 
including some safety function, then the risk is a function of the  
- probability of a dangerous condition arising, 
- probability of the computer not detecting it, 
- probability of the computer not initiating its safety function, 
- probability of the safety function not preventing the hazard, 
- probability of conditions occurring that will cause the hazard to lead to an accident, 
- worst-case severity of the accident. 
In almost all cases, the correct way to combine the elements of the risk function are 
unknown, as are the values of the parameters of the function.  
Traditional hazard analyses consist of identifying events that could lead the system to a 
hazardous state. These events are usually organized into causal chains or trees. Popular 
event-based hazard analysis techniques include Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Because of their reliance on discrete failure 
events, neither of these techniques adequately handles software or system accidents that 
result from dysfunctional interactions between system components. 
Hazard analysis usually requires searching for potential sources of hazards through large 
system state spaces. To handle this complexity it is possible to use a State Machine Hazard 
Analysis (Leveson 1987). While any state machine modeling language can be used, it is more 
efficient to use a language providing higher-level abstractions, such as Statecharts (Harel 1987).  
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The tasks of the software development process that relates to software hazard analysis include: 
- Tracing identified system hazards to the software-hardware interface and then into 
requirements and constraints on software behavior. 
-  Showing the consistency of the software safety constraints with the software 
requirements specification and demonstrating the completeness of the software 
requirements specification. 
In addition, because software can do more than what is specified in the requirements (the 
problem of unintended functions), the code itself must be analyzed to ensure that it cannot 
exhibit hazardous behavior. 
3. Security as a subset of safety 
Safety and security are closely related, and their similarity can be used to the advantage of 
both (Barchanski J.A., 2004),. Both deal with threats or risks – one with threats to life or 
property, and the other with threats to privacy or security. Both often involve negative 
requirements or constraints that may conflict with some important system goals. Both involve 
protection against losses, although the type of losses may be different. Both involve global 
system properties that are difficult to deal with outside of the system context. Both involve 
requirements that are considered of supreme importance in deciding whether the system can 
and should be used – that is particularly high level of assurance may be needed, and testing 
alone is insufficient to establish those levels. In fact, a higher level of assurance that a system is 
safe or secure may be needed than that system performs its intended functions. 
While we will consider mostly the issues of illegitimate access and usage of a robot there is 
another aspect less often encountered – denial of access. It is a threat in which the 
communication channel is made unusable by an attacker who transmits noise on purpose 
(jamming). While it is not possible to survive jamming when the attacker is all powerful and 
can make the entire spectrum unusable over the spatio-temporal range of interest, it may be 
possible to drive up the cost of jamming.  Two widely used techniques for this  are 
frequency hopping and direct sequence spread. In both techniques the receiver must know 
the pseudorandom sequence of frequencies used by the transmitter. An attacker wishing to 
jam the channel must either discover the sequence or jam a sufficient number of frequencies, 
therefore employing much more power (and money) than the transmitter. 
It should be clear that this protection is conditional on transmitter and receiver having 
previously established some shared key (e.g. by imprinting as described in the following 
paragraph). 
There are also important differences between safety and security. Security focuses on 
malicious actions, whereas safety is also concerned with well intended actions. In addition, 
the primary emphasis in security traditionally has been preventing unauthorized access to 
classified information, as opposed to preventing more general malicious activities. Note, 
however, that if an accident or loss event may be caused by illegitimate or malicious access 
or usage of a system, then security becomes a subset of safety. 
4. Safety aspects of autonomous robots 
The concept of autonomy plays an important role in robotics. It relates to an individual or 
collective ability to decide and act consistently without outside control or intervention. 
Autonomous robots hold the promise of new operation possibilities, easier design and 
development, and lower operating costs. 
Achieving safety of autonomous robots is much more challenging than teleoperated robots. 
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To improve safety of autonomous systems, adjustable autonomy can be used, in which the 
robot is autonomous to some degree only so a human may still retain more or less control of 
its behavior. While verification of the safety of a fully autonomous robot designed for a 
critical mission requires extensive test and analysis, safety verification of a semi-
autonomous robot designed for the same mission is less strict – it includes only design 
requirements analysis and testing. 
Mobile robots control software can implement different robot control architectures.  
The oldest  architectures were of a hierarchical  type,  highly influenced by the AI research 
of its time. This meant a system having an elaborate model of the world, using sensors to 
update this model, and to draw conclusions based on the updated model. This is often 
called the sense-plan-act paradigm or deliberative architecture. The hierarchical 
architectures did not perform well partly because of the difficulty in modeling of the world, 
partly because of relying too much on inadequate sensors. 
In 1987 Rodney Brooks  revolutionized the field by presenting an architecture based on purely 
reactive behaviours with little or no knowledge of the world. The reactive architecture is 
inherently parallel, fast, operates on short time scales and is scalable. There are two general 
kinds of reactive architectures – subsumption and potential field (Arkin 1999). Reactive 
architectures eliminate planning and any functions that involve remembering or reasoning 
about the global state of the robot relative to its environment. That means that a robot cannot 
plan optimal trajectories,  make maps, monitor its own performance or even select the best 
behaviours to use to accomplish a task (general planning). 
The solutions to the drawbacks of reactive architectures appeared in hybrid architectures 
combining the reactive architectures with modified deliberative architectures. They combine 
different representations and time scales, combine closed-loop and open loop execution, 
may re-use plans and allow dynamic replanning [Murphy 2000]. 
There is a number of other robot architectures designed independently of the above classes 
(e.g., Alami et al, 1998). Especially interesting are architectures including learning or 
adaptive components. The ability to adapt is key to survival in dynamic environments. 
When robots are adaptive, the following questions need to be addressed: 
1. Is learning applied to one or more robots? 
2. If multiple robots are adaptive, are they competing or cooperating? 
3. What element(s) of the robot(s) get adapted? 
4. What techniques are used to adapt?  
Learning may alter some components of robot strategy, for example, it may change the 
choice of actions to take in response to a stimulus. Learning may be motivated by 
observation, it could be initiated in response to success/failure, or be prompted by a general 
need for performance improvement. The motivation influences the choice of learning 
technique. Nearly every learning technique has been used for robots. The two most 
prevalent techniques are reinforcement learning (RL) and evolutionary algorithms (EA).  
A very popular form of RL is Q-learning, where robots update their probabilities of taking 
actions in a given situation based on penalty/reward. 
Introduction of learning makes behavior of robots significantly harder to predict. It is 
necessary therefore to develop efficient methods for determining whether the behavior of 
learning robots remains within the bounds of prespecified constraints (properties) after 
learning. This includes verifying that properties are preserved for single robots as well as 
verifying that properties are preserved for multirobot systems. We want the robots to be not 
only adaptive, but as well predictable and timely. Predictability can be achieved by formal 
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verification while timeliness by streamlining reverification, using the knowledge of what 
learning was done. Fast  reverification after learning must include  proofs that certain useful 
learning operators (in case of EA) are a priori guaranteed to be “safe” with respect to some 
important classes of properties, i.e. if the property holds for the robot prior to learning, then 
it is guaranteed to still hold after learning ( Gordon-Spears, 2001). If a robot uses these 
“safe” learning operators, it will be guaranteed to preserve the properties with no 
reverification required. 
5. Hazard analysis of an exemplary case 
As an example we will consider a mobile robot acting in a world where the three Laws of  
Robotics (Asimov 1950) should be satisfied. We will be concerned with the hazards resulting 
from the first two Laws, which are relevant for human-robot interactions : 
First Law: “A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, may not allow a 
human being to come to harm”. 
From the first half of the Law: “A robot may not injure a human being” – the hazard is a 
harmful physical contact with a human. 
It can be mitigated by a safety constraint inherent in the robot behavior avoid _obstacles. 
The second part of the law :“A robot through inaction, may not allow a human being to 
come to harm” envisioned by Asimov as a kind of action requiring sacrifice of robot 
existence to protect its master, is left for future generations of roboticists. At present it may 
be implemented at most aposteriori by search and rescue robots. 
The second law: “A robot must obey the orders, given to it by human beings except where 
such orders would conflict with the First Law.” 
This law has to do with tasks commanded by a human, like: move-to-goal,  grasp,  collect-
pucks, etc. The robot must be able to communicate with a human operator to execute his 
orders. The examples of  hazards  violating this law are communication security hazards – e.g. 
receiving from an  illegitimate operator false commands or requests which may cause wrong 
actions. To eliminate such hazards it must be possible to authenticate the human operator. 
Most conventional authentication  protocols  (e.g. Kerberos)  require usage of an online 
server. This is out of the question here. Another widely used authentication protocol which 
seems to be more suitable is one based on public key cryptography. It was in fact proposed 
for authentication of cooperating autonomous digger and dumper truck [Chandler et al 
2001]. However the problem of online access to the server appears here as well. What we 
need is to be able to create a secure transient association. As well as being secure, the 
association must also be transient. When an operator  changes, the robot has to obey the new 
operator. A solution for this dilemma is to use a metaphor of a duckling emerging from its 
egg – it will recognize as its mother the first moving object it sees that makes a sound, 
regardless of what it looks like:  this phenomenon is called imprinting. Similarly, our robot 
will recognize as its owner the first entity that gives it a secret key. As soon as this 
imprinting key is received, the robot is no longer a newborn and will stay faithful to its 
owner for the rest of its life. The association is secure. 
To make the association transient, the robot must be designed so it can die (loose its 
memory) and resurrect (be imprinted again). This security policy model, called 
“Resurrecting Duckling” (Stajano 2002) can be used not only in the communications 
between a human and a robot but between two robots as well, enabling robot-to-robot 
secure interaction. 
We will focus in the following on the hazard involving collision with an obstacle, whether it 
is a human or not. To deal with this hazard, a robot should be able first to detect the 
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obstacle, then recognize it and finally execute the avoidance manoeuvre. Obstacle 
recognition is useful only if the robot is supposed to cooperate with a human or another 
robot. Recognition of a human is quite a difficult task. It is necessary to use for this some 
special sensors (e.g. a suite of vision and thermal sensors). Recognition of another robot may 
be easier as it is possible to give the robot a special appearance (e.g. color). To reduce the 
risk of collision, robots must have some kind of a behavior to avoid obstacles. This behavior 
should be active all the time, concurrently with any other behavior active at the moment. We 
will discuss in the following how efficient are the obstacle avoidance behaviors in different 
robot control architectures. 
6. Safety of different robot control architectures 
6.1 Reactive architectures 
As we have noticed above, the hierarchical architecture does not provide adequate 
functionality for obstacle avoidance. Much better equipped for this purpose are reactive 
architectures. The main reason for this is their direct connection of sensors to actuators. Even 
though the architecture does not have a memory-based world model, but as Brooks said 
“the world itself is its best model.” Continuous sensing guarantees that it is always current, 
though not always correct, due to the sensors errors or failures. One of the characteristics of 
reactive architectures is their ability for graceful degradation of emergent behavior (Jones 
2004). Let us consider a mobile robot moving to a goal and equipped with a number of 
different sensors. In the simplest case it will not discriminate between different kinds of 
obstacles. Failure of a sensor to detect an obstacle is called false negative. A false positive 
occurs when a sensor reports a condition that does not exists. From the viewpoint of safety a 
false negative implies a hazard to be dealt with. One way to mitigate this hazard is to use a 
set of different sensors invoking suitable behaviors. For example a robot may use for long 
distance journey a sonar-avoid behavior. While still some distance off, the robot will turn 
away from sonar detected obstacles. But sonar sensors are easily fooled. Smooth surfaces 
struck at shallow angles reflect sonar beams forward, not back toward the robot – thus no 
echo is ever detected, causing the sonar system to report a false negative. When this 
happens, the robot believes that the path is clear, even if it is not. In this case, the sonar-
avoid behavior fails to trigger. But as the robot approaches the acoustically specular object, 
typically the infrared (IR) detectors will sense an obstacle and drive the robot away. But 
perhaps along with being too smooth and set at too oblique an angle, the obstacle’s surface 
is also too dark to reflect IR radiation reliably back to the IR obstacle detector. Thus the IR 
detector may also fail to sense the object, generating a false negative of its own. 
With no signal from the IR detector, the IR-avoid behavior does not trigger and the robot 
collides with the obstacle. The robot bumper now compresses and triggers the Bumper-
escape behavior. Having failed to avoid the obstacle, the robot must now back up and try to 
turn away. Typically, the bump sensors can detect, at least crudely, where the collision has 
occurred, say, on the right, or the left of the robot. This knowledge can give the robot an 
indication of how to respond.  
The performance of the robot may suffer, but the robot can still continue its mission. But 
suppose there is yet another difficulty, say, that the bumper is not a full-coverage bumper or 
that it has a dead spot at some point and it is exactly that point that the troublesome smooth, 
dark oblique object contacts the bumper. Now the bumper fails to report the collision and 
accordingly, the Bumper-escape behavior never triggers. We are left with our robot pressing 
against the object with all its might. Fortunately, an over-current sensor is available to detect 
this condition. When the drive motors are asked to work too hard, as can happen, when 
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they force the robot against an object, motor current goes up. Too high current for too long a 
time is sensed and is used to trigger a Stall-escape behavior. Although there is no reliable 
way to tell where the blockage is located with respect to the robot, Stall-escape can at least 
command the robot to retreat and spin. So, the robot still can move towards its goal. We 
have assumed that all the problems are caused by a difficult-to-detect obstacle. But the same 
behavior would be produced by some inoperative sensors. 
Note that the emergent desirable behavior does not require writing a special code that 
would explicitly instruct the robot to determine if a sensor is working properly. It is just the 
feature of behavior-based architecture. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Reactive architecture with  graceful degradation. 
The above examples show a crucial difference between the behavior-based approach of 
reactive architectures and the traditional deliberative approach. In reactive architectures we 
do not employ a single expensive sensor from which we must demand unattainable levels of 
precision and reliability. Rather we achieve superior results using a combination of 
relatively unreliable systems that work together to deliver safe behavior. 
In the original subsumption architecture the speed was decided by the behavior subsuming 
all the other behaviors. Quite often the speed was fixed – the same for all the winning 
behaviors. 
In case of reactive architecture using potential fields for coordination of behaviors (Arkin 
1999) the emergent speed is the magnitude of the vector summed from all the active 
behaviors. It allows therefore to avoid obstacles while moving towards a goal – providing 
better overall behavior than subsumption architecture. 
6.2 Hybrid architectures  
The reactive architectures do not have an ability to monitor performance of the robot or to 
use e.g. an optimal speed and path to a destination, while avoiding obstacle. This can be 
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mitigated by appropriately designed deliberative layer of a hybrid architecture. For 
example, in managerial architectures (Murphy 2000), the deliberative layer may include a 
Sensing Manager monitoring performance of the robot. If a behavior fails or a perceptual 
schema detects that sensor values are not consistent or reasonable, the Sensing Manager is 
alerted. It can then identify alternative perceptual schemas, or even behaviors, to replace the 
problematic behaviour immediately. Imagine a mobile robot in a convoy of robots hauling 
food to refugees. If the robot had a glitch in a sensor, it should not suddenly stop and think 
about a problem. Instead it should immediately switch to a back-up plan or even to 
smoothly slow down while it identifies a back-up plan. Otherwise, the whole convoy would 
stop, there might be wrecks, etc. The sensing manager working in the background mode, 
can attempt to diagnose the cause of the problem and correct it. 
In some managerial architectures (e.g. SFX (Murphy 1996) speed control is considered a 
separate behavior. The safe speed of a robot depends on many influences. If the robot 
cannot turn in place, it will need to be operating at a slow speed to make the turn without 
overshooting. Likewise, it may go slower as it goes up or down hills. These influences are 
derived from sensors, and the action is a template (the robot always slows down on hills), so 
speed control is a legitimate behavior. But the other behaviors should have some influence 
on the speed as well. So, these other strategic behaviors contribute a strategic speed to the 
speed control behaviour. If the strategic speed is less than the safe speed computed from the 
tactical influences, then the output speed is the strategic speed. But if the tactical safe speed 
is lower, the output speed is the tactical speed. Tactical behaviors serve as filters on strategic 
commands to ensure that the robot acts in a safe manner in as close accordance with the 
strategic intent as possible. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Strategic and tactical behaviors for path following in SFX architecture. 
An example of the Model-oriented architectures is the Task Control Architecture (TCA) 
(Simmons 1999). TCA has a flavor of an operating system. There are no behaviors per se, 
however many of low level tasks resemble behaviors. The reactive layer in this architecture 
called Obstacle Avoidance Layer takes the desired heading and adapts it to the obstacles 
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extracted from the evidence grid virtual sensor. The layer uses a curvature-velocity method 
(CVM) to factor in not only obstacles but how to respond with a smooth trajectory for the 
robot’s current velocity. Because this architecture does not have direct connection of sensors 
to actuators, it may have the same problems as the hierarchical architectures of the past – 
delayed  response to events. 
7. System-theoretic approach 
To make a progress in dealing with safety in complex systems, we need new models and 
conceptions of how accidents occur, that more accurately and completely reflect the types of 
accidents we are experiencing today. 
We use for safety analysis of robot control architectures a system-theoretical approach 
(Barchanski, J.A. 2006), which allows more complex relationships between events to be 
considered and also provides a way to look more deeply at why the events occurred. Whereas 
industrial safety models focus on unsafe acts or conditions and reliability engineering 
emphasizes failure events, a systems approach to safety takes a broader view by focusing on 
what was wrong with the system’s design or operations that allowed the accident to take place.   
System theory dates from the thirties and forties, and was a response to limitations to the 
classic analysis techniques in coping with the increasingly complex systems being built. 
Norbert Wiener applied this approach to control and communications engineering while 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy developed similar ideas for biology. It was Bertalanffy who 
suggested that the emerging ideas in various fields could be combined into a general theory 
of systems (Bertalanffy 1969) . 
The systems approach focuses on systems taken as a whole, not on the parts examined 
separately. It assumes that some properties of systems can only be treated adequately in 
their entirety, taking into account all facets relating the social to technical aspects. These 
system properties derive from the relationships between the parts of systems: how the parts 
interact and fit together. Thus the system approach concentrates on the analysis and design 
of the system as a whole as distinct from the components or the parts. While components 
may be constructed in a modular fashion, the original analysis and decomposition must be 
performed top down.  
The foundations of system theory rests on two pairs of ideas:  
(1) emergence and hierarchy and (2) communication and control (Checkland 1981). 
7.1 Emergence and hierarchy 
A general model of complex systems can be expressed in terms of hierarchy of levels of 
organization, each more complex than the one below, where a level is characterized by 
having emergent properties.  
Emergent properties do not exist at lower levels; they are meaningless  in the language 
appropriate to those levels. Thus, the operation of the processes at the higher levels of the 
hierarchy results in a higher levels of complexity – that has emergent properties.  
Safety is an emergent property of systems. Determining whether a plant is acceptable safe is 
not possible by examining a single valve in the plant.  
In fact, statements about the “safety of the valve” without information about the context in 
which the valve is used, are meaningless. In a system-theoretic view of safety the emergent 
safety properties are controlled or enforced by a set of safety constraints related to the 
behavior of the system components.  
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A second basic part of system theory, the hierarchy theory, deals with the fundamental 
differences between levels of a hierarchy. Its ultimate aim is to explain the relationship 
between different levels, what generates the levels, what separates them, and what links 
them. Emergent properties associated with a set of components at one level in a hierarchy 
are related to constraints upon the degree of freedom of those components. 
In a systems-theoretic view of safety the emergent safety properties are controlled or 
enforced by a set of safety constraints related to the behavior of the system components. 
Safety constraints specify those relationships among system variables or components that 
constitute the non-hazardous or safe system states. Accidents result from interactions 
among system components that violate these constraints – in other words, from a lack of 
appropriate constraints on system behavior. 
7.2 Communication and control 
Regulatory or control action is the imposition of constraints upon the activity at one level of 
a hierarchy, which define the “laws of behavior” at that level yielding activity meaningful at 
a higher level. 
Hierarchies are characterized by control processes operating at the interfaces between levels. 
Any description of a control process entails an upper level imposing constraints upon the 
lower. The upper level is a source of an alternative (simpler) description of the lower level in 
terms of specific functions that are emergent as a result of the imposition of constraints. 
Control in open systems (those that have inputs and outputs from their environment) 
implies the need for communication. A system is not treated as a static design, but as a 
dynamic process that is continually adapting to achieve its ends and to react to changes in 
itself and its environment. To be safe, the original design must not only enforce appropriate 
constraints on behavior to ensure safe operation (the enforcement of  the safety constraints), 
but it must continue to operate safely as changes and adaptations occur over time. 
8. Intent specification 
Conventional software engineering uses top-down and bottom-up hierarchies of two kinds: 
- part-whole abstractions (where each level represents aggregation of components of the 
lower level),   
- information-hiding abstraction (where each level is a refinement of the information at a 
higher level). 
Higher level specifies the “what”, lower level specifies  the “how”. There is no place to 
specify the “why” (intent, goal, purpose) of a level.   
Systems-theoretical approach allows to do this in so called Intent Specification (Leveson 2000) 
which complements the conventional methodology – it implements the “means – ends” 
hierarchy, where each level provides the intent (“why”) information about the level below. 
The specification supports safety-driven development by tightly integrating the system 
safety process and the information resulting from it into the system engineering process and 
decision–making environment. The goal is to support design of safe systems rather than 
simply attempt to verify safety after-the–fact. Safety-related design decisions are linked to 
hazard analysis and design implementations so that assurance of safety is enhanced as well 
as any analysis required when changes are proposed. 
The levels are used to specify user requirements, environmental assumptions and safety 
constraints.  
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Especially useful feature of the intent specifications is strong support of traceability. The 
structure of the intent specification is such that each level above provides rationale for why 
decisions at the lower levels were made the way they were. To be able to follow this 
reasoning easily, traceability links are encouraged throughout the document. For example, 
each hazard would link, within the same level, to the safety design constraints that mitigate 
the hazard. Each safety constraint would then link down from level one to level two where 
design decisions comply with and enforce the constraint. Those design decisions would link 
down to level three, the subcomponent requirements, where the subcomponent 
requirements adhere to the system level design decisions. These links go from the highest 
level goals of the system all the way down to the code and operator manuals. By following 
these links, one follows the reasoning behind the system's behavior and can evaluate the 
safety of changes to the system. 
We will review in the following four  levels of the intent specification 
8.1 Design and safety constraints – level 1  
Requirements document what things the system should do. Constraints document things 
that the system should not do. Constraints provide limits on the space of possible designs 
within which the system will behave as desired. Intent specifications frequently divide 
constraints into those that are related to safety and those that are not. Safety constraints are 
design constraints motivated by safety concerns. It is fairly easy to derive safety constraints 
from hazards. For example, if a hazard for an autonomous mobile robot is having its arm 
extended while it is in motion, then the safety constraint could be written that the robot 
must not move while its arm is extended. Safety constraints link to the hazards that 
generated them and to the design decisions that enforce them.  
8.2 System design principles – level 2  
The core of the level 2 of an intent specification is the set of design principles that specify 
how the design will satisfy the requirements documented in level 1 while not violating any 
design constraints.  The functional design principles show the functional decomposition 
upon which the software logic is structured. It is useful to divide the robot control 
functionality into different operating modes (e.g. initialization, autonomy, operator, and 
safety). The functionality for each mode should be independent of the others. This feature 
allows the designers to change the internal logic of one mode without worrying about the 
effect the changes will have on the other modes. 
The mode selection logic implements the mode transitions. 
8.3 Black box specification – level 3 
Level 3 is designed to provide the system designers with a complete set of tools with which 
to validate the specified requirements before implementation begins. Only black box 
(externally visible) behavior is included, i.e. the input/output function to be computed by 
the component. Black box models assist in the requirements review process by eliminating 
implementation details that do not affect external behavior and thus are not relevant in the 
validation of the requirements. For this purpose, a model of the robot control system is 
produced using formal specification language SpecTRM-RL (Leveson 2002). 
Most model elements in SpecTRM-RL rely on AND/OR tables. The tables pictured below 
are part of the transitions for the “Distance” state in the obstacle avoidance behavior. 
AND/OR tables provide a very simple way to read the behavior of a component. 
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The first column of the table contains expressions that may be true or false. In the very first 
row of the table for the Unknown transition below, the expression is System Start. This 
expression is true at the instant the system is first started and false at all other times. The next 
row's expression is true when the Reset input has a value of High and false at other times. 
When reading a table, the true or false value of this first column is matched against the values 
in subsequent columns. Subsequent columns must contain T indicating true, F for false, or * for 
don't care. If every row in the first column matches the values in some subsequent column, the 
table as a whole is true. If no column matches, then the table is not true. Another way of saying 
this is that rows are ANDed together and columns are ORed together 
As an example, consider the Unknown transition below. If the table is true, then the system 
will transition to the state “distance to an obstacle” being unknown. This table can be read 
as saying that the distance transitions to unknown if the system is just starting, the system is 
being reset, or all the sensors are in the unknown state. 
All the system state variables in a SpecTRM-RL model are required to have an "Unknown" 
value. A very common error found in requirements specifications and often associated with 
accidents is assuming that the computer always has an accurate (up-to-date) model of the 
controlled system. If input processing and feedback is disrupted for some reason (including 
temporary halting of the computer itself) however, the assumed controlled-system state may 
inaccurately reflect the real state. In SpecTRM-RL models, each state variable defaults to the 
unknown value at startup and returns to the unknown value after interruptions in 
processing or expected (and necessary) inputs are not received. 
 
 
8.4 Physical and logical design – level 4 
Level 4 describes the physical and logical designs of each subcomponent that allows them to 
meet the subcomponent requirements described at level 3. The component may be 
hardware, software, or some combination of the two. 
Software Design Specifications can be represented in any design notation customarily used 
for software. Intent specifications can incorporate any desirable design notation, from 
formal predicate logic to UML diagrams.  
Requirement specifications are mapped into design specifications of a selected robot control 
architecture. The mapping can be done in one of three ways: 
Uncoupled: the mappings or functions from requirements to design principles are all one-
to-one. 
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Loosely coupled: the mappings are one-to-many. 
Tightly coupled: the mappings are many-to-many. 
For any complex control system, a completely uncoupled designs, while allowing changes to 
requirements with minimal impact, is usually not practical.  
A tightly-coupled system is highly interdependent. Each part is tightly linked to many other 
parts, so that a failure or unplanned behaviour in one, can rapidly affect the status of others. 
This is definitely not desirable. 
The most appropriate and realistic is to design the system in such a way as to reduce the 
impact of requirements changes, i.e. to eliminate the rippling  effects to other requirements, 
by designing the mappings to be one-to-many (loosely coupled). By  this, a failure of a 
design element can be traced to incorrect or incomplete requirement.  
8.5 Determinism analysis 
A system is nondeterministic when it may display one of several behaviors for the same 
sequence of inputs. Nondeterministic systems are very difficult to analyze and test because 
of the element of chance in their behavior. It is strongly desirable for a safety-critical system 
to behave in a deterministic fashion. 
SpecTRM-RL models are models of the requirements for system components. 
Nondeterminism in the behavior of a SpecTRM-RL model indicates inconsistency in the 
requirements. Additional information must be added to the specification to collapse the case 
of nondeterminism down to one deterministic choice. The following is an example of 
nondeterminism in a SpecTRM-RL model. 
 
 
This example is taken from the robot control mode. According to the first table, the robot 
goes to the Operational mode any time the Reset button is pushed. According to the second 
table's first column, the robot transitions to Internal Fault Detected whenever it was already 
in Internal Fault Detected. This specification is ambiguous as to whether a reset command 
should put the system in an operational state once a fault has been detected.  
8.6 Completeness analysis 
A system is complete when there is a specified response for every sequence of inputs that 
might come into the system. Incomplete systems have combinations of system states and 
www.intechopen.com
 
Development of Safe and Secure Control Software for Autonomous Mobile Robots 53 
inputs for which no response is specified. Incompletness occurs when there is no table in a 
state or mode definition that is true for some set of conditions. Additional information must 
be added to the specification to make one of the tables true. 
9. Related methods 
The closest to presented above approach to system safety is an industrial hazard analysis 
method called HAZard Operability analysis (HAZOP) developed for the British chemical 
industry in the 1950’s. The goal of a HAZOP is to identify operational deviations from 
intended performance and study their impact on system safety (Soukas, 1988).   
The HAZOP procedure is carried out by a HAZOP expert (the leader) and a team of system 
experts. The leader poses a battery of questions to the experts in an attempt to elicit potential 
system hazards. A HAZOP is potentially an exploratory analysis as neither potential faults 
nor hazards have been assumed beforehand. The HAZOP leader hypothesizes an abnormal 
condition and analysis proceeds in both directions, determining whether and how the 
condition is possible and what effects it has on the system. 
The analysis is based on a systems theory model of accidents, in that it concentrates on the 
hazards that can result from components interaction, i.e. accidents are caused by deviations 
in component behavior. 
HAZOP has several limitations. First, it is time- and labor –intensive, in large part due to its 
reliance on group discussions and manual analysis procedures. Second, HAZOP analyzes 
causes and effects with respect to deviations from expected behaviour, but it does not 
analyze whether the design, under normal operating conditions, yields expected behaviour 
or if the expected behaviour is what is desired. 
A third limitations arises from the fact that HAZOP is a flow-based analysis. Deviations from 
within a component or processes are not expected directly; instead, deviation within a 
component (as well as human error or other environmental disturbance) is assumed to be 
manifested as a disturbed flow. A purely flow oriented approach may cause the analyst to 
neglect process-related malfunctions and hazards in favour of pipe-related causes and effects. 
Because HAZOP concentrates on physical properties of the system (Souskas, 1988), it is not 
directly applicable to analyzing computer input and output. 
There is a number of other manual methods for hazard analysis (e.g. Lear, 1993). All of these 
methods suffer from two weaknesses with respect to analyzing software. First, being 
manual techniques they depend on human understanding of the proposed software, which 
can be quite limited. Second, the manual techniques adhere to the HAZOP principle of 
identifying deviations in the connections, i.e., the computer inputs and outputs only. 
Accordingly, they do not provide guidance for following deviations into the control logic. 
10. Conclusion 
Knowledge of how to build safe and secure autonomous mobile robots is a prerequisite for 
their wide acceptance. In this chapter we have described relationship between robot autonomy 
and its safety and security. In contrast to traditional hazard analysis techniques used in electro-
mechanical systems, we have introduced a technique based on system theory. We have 
outlined a methodology for building safe autonomous mobile robots based on hazard analysis 
and intent specification. The specification supports safety-driven development by tightly 
integrating the system safety process and the information resulting from it into the system 
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engineering process and decision–making environment. The goal is to support design of safe 
systems rather than simply attempt to verify safety after-the–fact. Safety-related design 
decisions are linked to hazard analysis and design implementations so that assurance of safety 
is enhanced as well as any analysis required when changes are proposed. 
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